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Abstract. Although there are privacy-enhancing tools designed to pro-
tect users’ online privacy, it is surprising to see a lack of user-centric
solutions allowing privacy control based on the joint assessment of pri-
vacy risks and benefits, due to data disclosure to multiple platforms. In
this paper, we propose a conceptual framework to fill the gap: aiming
at the user-centric privacy protection, we show the framework can not
only assess privacy risks in using online services but also the added val-
ues earned from data disclosure. Through following a human-in-the-loop
approach, it is expected the framework provides a personalized solution
via preference learning, continuous privacy assessment, behavior moni-
toring and nudging. Finally, we describe a case study towards “leisure
travelers” and several future areas to be studied in the ongoing project.
Keywords: Privacy; Transparency; Data disclosure; User-centricity; Pro-
filing; Behavioral nudging; Human-in-the-loop; Ontology
1 Introduction
The Internet User Stats (IWS) 2019 reported that over 56% of the whole global
population were relying on the Internet to live their lives and do business on-
line [26]. Being in the cyber-physical systems (CPS) where the boundary between
? This is an extended version of the following paper providing more detailed expla-
nation to the work reported: Yang Lu, Shujun Li, Athina Ioannou and Iis Tussya-
diah, “From Data Disclosure to Privacy Nudges: A Privacy-aware and User-centric
Personal Data Management Framework,” accepted to DependSys 2019 (5th Inter-
national Conference on Dependability in Sensor, Cloud, and Big Data Systems and
Applications), to be held from November 12-15, 2019 in Guangzhou, China, to be
published in a volume of Communications in Computer and Information Science by
Springer. Please use the above citation when referring to this paper.
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physical and cyber worlds is disappearing, people need to disclose personal data
to many external entities (organizations and other people) for using their pro-
vided services. In addition, service providers often encourage their customers
to disclose more personal data for added values, e.g., special discounts or more
personalized services. As a result, many people have their personal data spread
over many services, and frequently become victims of data breach incidents.
Such data breaches have been happening at a larger scale – more frequently,
impacting more users of more service providers.
The importance of protecting user privacy has also led to a widely accepted
concept called “Privacy by Design” (PbD). The PbD concept has been offi-
cially recognized by some new data protection and privacy laws such as the EU
GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) coming into force in May 2018,
which clearly defines “data protection by design and by default” (Article 25) as
one of the explicitly listed principles. In the most developed version consisting
of seven principles [8], two principles “Respect for User Privacy” and “Visibility
and Transparency” highlight the requirement of keeping privacy user-centric, op-
erationally transparent and visible. Existing privacy protection mainly relies on
organization-facing solutions such as data leakage/loss prevention (DLP) [17].
With the focus on user-centric design, privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs)
are developed to address privacy issues within different applications, such as on
online social networks (OSNs) [45], cloud-computing platforms [31], mobile oper-
ating systems [27,32] as well as Internet-of-Thing (IoT) [12,38,31] environments.
Despite existing methods proposed for user-centric privacy, we have observed a
general lack of universal frameworks that can cover personal preference man-
agement, trade-offs between privacy risks and value enhancement1 as well as
behavioral nudging. This paper fills the gap by proposing such an “all-in-one”
framework with the following key features:
– Easy bootstrapping of the system from flexible user input and historical data
disclosure.
– User-centricity achieved based on data disclosure behaviors of “me” (the
owner and user of the framework) collected completely at the client side, i.e.,
on his/her local computing device(s).
– Being completely service-independent as it does not introduce dependency
on any external online services or a new remote service. This is important to
make the solution completely user-centric and under the user’s full control.
– Trade-off analysis between privacy and added value in the whole process,
from personal preference management, joint privacy risk-value analysis, to
behavioral nudging for a better trade-off between the two aspects.
– Use of a computational ontology to enable automatic reasoning about data
and value flows, for the purposes of joint privacy risk-value analysis and
nudging construction.
– Human-in-the-loop design enabling natural human-machine teaming via hu-
man behavior monitoring and nudging based on technical tools.
1 Such value refers to the added values a user can obtain by disclosing data to service
providers, in addition to receiving the basic services wanted.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The design of the proposed
framework is explained in Section 3. Then, a case study about privacy protection
of leisure travelers’ data in Section 4 illustrates how the framework can be used to
help a traveler to decide on disclosing personal information for added values. This
can also echo the aim of ongoing project, PriVELT (https://privelt.ac.uk/)
to develop a user-centric platform based on travelers’ privacy-related behaviours
so that effectively nudge them to share their personal data more responsibly.
Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper with future work.
2 Related Work
To design a user-centric framework for data privacy protection and value en-
hancement, we studied related work on privacy preference learning and profiling,
privacy risk assessment as well as privacy nudging.
such work can be broadly categorized into three main areas: privacy prefer-
ence learning and profiling, privacy assessment and behavioral nudging.
2.1 Preference Learning and Profiling
Privacy means differently to different people. Since Westin’s Indexes segmented
consumers in the Fundamentalists, Unconcerned and Pragmatists [42], researchers
have shown interest in privacy segmentation and thus developed this categoriza-
tion from different aspects [35,18,13,29]. As the classic categorizations (Westin’s
Index and its variants) are questioned in predicting people’s actual behaviors,
contextual factors and demographic variables were analysed and attributed to
resultant clusters [13,42,30,28]. Segmenting customers based on the disclosure
behaviors can help system developers to understand their online customers bet-
ter, customize and deliver privacy settings according to the user preference pre-
dicted. For instance, participants were requested to rank statements about pri-
vacy behaviors in technology services [23]. Besides, different sequences of data
requests were tested to increase the prediction accuracy [44]. Through devel-
oping the location-sharing system “Locate!”, participants were observed when
sending real-time locations at some accuracy levels. Then, the impacts of request
categories (social connections, etc.) on users’ location-sharing willingness were
evaluated [29]. Regarding online advertisers, Kumaraguru et al. concluded that
participants’ willingness of disclosure was affected by data sensitivity, perceived
benefits as well as the relevance to advertisements [19]. Among the mobile users,
four segments were identified based on the reported comfort levels to pairwise
mobile permissions and purposes [23]. Similar methods were applied to study
users’ preferences in Internet of Things (IoT) environments [25] and online so-
cial network (OSN) platforms [43]. In addition to profiling users with privacy
preferences, we find the lack of analysing added values earned by disclosing data
to service providers. Besides, insufficient work was done on adaptive preference
management based on previous disclosure. As planned in the ongoing project,
more details can be found in Section 3.
2.2 Privacy Assessment
Privacy impact assessment (PIA) refers to a systematic assessment which can
be incorporated in decision-making in privacy management [40]. Certain guide-
lines have been developed and released by organizations cross different coun-
tries [10,9,11].In a PIA template, each privacy risk can be evaluated by com-
bining the quantities of impact and likelihood that it can cause [39]. Specially,
to assess data privacy impacts caused by data disclosure, certain processes are
modelled with personal characteristics and contextual features. For instance, Al-
nemr et al. designed a data protection impact assessment (DPIA) tool based on
the legal analysis of General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) as well as the
evaluation of privacy issues in cloud deployment [4]. Noticing sensitive attributes
can be collected, accumulated, and used on smart grids, Seto implemented PIA
procedures for smart grids in the United States and demonstrated it could ef-
fectively visualize the privacy risks in specific activities [34]. Towards the risks
existing in publicly released datasets, Ali-Eldin et al. designed a scoring system
containing a privacy risk indicator and privacy risk mitigation measure in data
releases [5]. Since privacy risks can be caused by data disclosure to external
entities (e.g., organizations and other users), we proposed a high-level model
in Section 3.2 to capture possible data flows among parties while using online
services. More importantly, the proposed knowledge model highlights that the
relations between data flows and added values should be considered together.
2.3 Privacy Nudging
Behavioral nudging refers to the use of interface elements aiming to guide user
behaviors, when people are required to make judgements and decisions [41].
Since human decision making is influenced by biases and heuristics, privacy
nudging aims to help users to make better decisions without restricting their
options [33]. The effects of nudging on privacy related outcomes such as willing-
ness to disclose information or likelihood to transact with an e-commerce website
have been studied in various contexts [14]. Previous studies have suggested the
wide use of technical nudging interventions in order to assist users in security
and privacy decisions [1]. Also, nudging dashboards can be seen as the core in
developing transparency-enhancing technologies (TETs): enable users to make
decisions based on sufficient information [3,16,15,7]. Therefore, any user-centric
privacy protection systems should explicitly consider how such unavoidable be-
havioral nudges are implemented at user interface levels and try to make ethical
choices for the user’s benefits and with their awareness.
Evidence on the effects of privacy nudging as a universal instrument for pri-
vacy intervention, however, is still inconclusive with a number of studies demon-
strating a significant effect of nudging on privacy decisions by limiting informa-
tion disclosure, while others showing contradictory results. Further research is
therefore essential in order to gain a comprehensive understanding on the im-
pact of nudging on privacy outcomes. Despite the inconclusive evidence about
privacy nudging in the literature, as Acquisti et al. pointed out in [1], “whenever
a designer creates a system, every design choice inescapably influences the user
in some way”, so nudging is not a choice but a fact. It deserves highlighting that
nudges can also be unintended or even malicious.
People are making choices every day in digital environments, such as e-
government applications, buying products in e-commerce websites, booking ho-
tels on mobile applications, etc. The interface elements embedded in all of these
environments influence users’ decisions, either intentionally or sometimes even
unintentionally, by how the system presents choices and organizes workflows (a
practice known as choice architecture).
2.4 Privacy Decision and Control
Privacy behavior research generally assumes that when making privacy decisions
people make rational deliberation comparing risks and benefits associated with
disclosing personal information [36]. The trade-offs between benefits and risks of
information disclosure are explained in the Privacy Calculus Theory [21], which
has been used in various forms in privacy research, such as theories of utility
maximization [6], expectancy theory of motivation [37], and expectancy-value
theory [2]. Further, in [22] Li proposed the Risk Calculus Theory, referring to
the trade-off between perceived risks and the efficacy to cope with these risks.
Together, they form the Dual-Calculus model of privacy, which determines users’
intention to disclose personal information. To put it simply, information disclo-
sure is expected to be a function of a user’s assessment of the risk of disclosure
and the extent to which he/she could cope with such risk. Users, however, often
rely on privacy seals as heuristic safety signals when transacting online, failing
to notice and fully process the statements of risk [20]. To that end, researchers
and practitioners alike have attempted to facilitate users’ comprehension of pri-
vacy risks, including ways to present risks of information disclosure in privacy
warning labels. The practice of influencing users to attend closely to information
regarding privacy risks can be considered privacy nudging discussed below.
3 The Proposed Framework
The proposed privacy-aware personal data management framework is user-centric
and service-independent, designed by following the “human-in-the-loop” con-
cept. By “user-centric” we mean that the framework has a central entity “me”
(the user being served), whose data disclosure behaviors are monitored by techni-
cal tools. By “service-independent” we mean that the framework runs completely
on the client side, without dependency on service providers, e.g., all processes are
done in such a way that no private or sensitive data are shared with any existing
or new remote service so no additional privacy issues will arise. The “human-
in-the-loop” concept refers to the fact that in the framework the human user
(“me”) provides preferences on privacy protection and add values, meanwhile
a higher level of personalization is allowed via incremental and dynamic user
profiling from “historical disclosure”, and thus achieve “user-centricity”.
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Fig. 1: The proposed framework with an example traveler-facing implementation
Figure 1 illustrates the high-level design of the framework with an example
implementation. The overall aim is to guide the user (“me”) to manage his/her
behaviors around personal data disclosure based on a better understanding of
what data have been disclosed to whom, for what purposes, when, for how long,
where, associated privacy risks and added values such data disclosure could bring.
From the user’s perspective, a typical implementation of the framework is a
computer application running from the user’s own computing devices, e.g., a
mobile app downloaded to a smart phone for helping an individual traveler to
manage data disclosure activities while travelling (a planned outcome of the
PriVELT research project, shown as the blue, lock-shaped app logo in Fig. 1).
Specifically, a system built on the proposed framework will have two processes
running in parallel to achieve the expected functionality:
The system continuously tracks the user’s behaviors and adjusts the user’s
profile for personalizing and contextualizing the joint privacy risk-value analysis
and behavioral nudging. The system is bootstrapped with some default settings,
including pre-trained AI models for various purposes (user profiling, privacy risk
assessment and behavioral nudging), a data-flow knowledge base (KB) for joint
privacy risk-value analysis, historical behavioral data on the user’s local device
and cloud servers the user has access from her/his local device, and optional
input from the user on her/his privacy preferences (e.g., using a questionnaire
regarding their privacy concerns). The bootstrapping process is light-weighted,
and the data needed can either be simply downloaded from an online repository,
collected from the user’s device or a remote storage owned by the user, or directly
obtained from the user.
While being service-independent, the framework can still benefit from op-
tional collaborations of third-party service providers, e.g., retrieving more useful
data from a service provider via an API into the client side for better user
profiling and privacy risk assessment.
1. Operational process. This process begins with setting the personal prefer-
ence on “privacy + value” and the arrival of data disclosure behaviors from using
external services. Based on these inputs, a joint privacy risk-value assessment
component is triggered to conduct a joint privacy risk-value analysis (1–3–4 ).
The analysis is based on the data-flow knowledge base (5–6 ), which is equipped
with a computational ontology covering semantic data flows between different
entities (“me” and other entities that may consume “my” data and sender of
“values” as a return of the data shared). Then, based on the user’s current
privacy-value preferences, real-time results about joint privacy risk and value
assessment will be presented to the user (7–8 ).
2. Learning process. By running an incremental learning process in parallel
with the operational process, the configured settings such as initial preference
and nudging templates can be presented in an adaptive manner. As shown in
Fig. 1, stored data disclosure can be divided in “Historical disclosure” and “Real-
time disclosure” based on a boundary pre-set. As the data gradually loses its
timeliness, relatively out-dated data will be labelled as “historical disclosure”,
meaning the previous disclosure behaviors. Through monitoring which items
were mostly released for added values (e.g., more discounts in booking.com), it
is possible that privacy requirements need to be lifted up or lowered down (11 ).
Besides, how the user interacts to nudging elements should be analyzed and in
turn affect the construction (9–10 ).
3.1 Preference Learning and Management
To a user-centric framework, personalization is the key. Therefore, the framework
needs to learn about the user’s privacy concerns and its privacy-value preferences.
We consider the privacy risks caused by and values gained from data disclosures
as conflicting aspects, and the framework aims at managing the user’s preferences
by providing the right trade-off. With user preferences on privacy protection and
value enhancement configuring the initial environment, each user (especially lay-
men) can quickly set a “baseline” in a particular context. Specifically, standard
groupings for privacy protection and value enhancement are pre-studied from
sample users’ input via different channels, such as online surveys, offline inter-
views and public data assets from online social networks (OSNs). Then, machine
learning algorithms can be applied to “categorize” sample individuals of differ-
ent profiles [46,23]. With such mappings stored in the “preference management”
module, a new system (for a new user) can be bootstrapped by classifying the
new user to an initial setting, given their “historical data” disclosed to other
entities in cyber-physical world. Later on, the framework will dynamically adapt
to the user’s behavioral change, which can lead to the user being allocated to
a different group or a new group created for the user if a new unique pattern
is observed. For the purpose of joint privacy risk-value assessment, each such
group is mapped to a profile, which can include parameters such as thresholds
on acceptable trade-offs between privacy risks and value enhancement. Through
comparing with the “current preferences”, real-time nudges can be constructed
for the user so he/she can learn and adapt his/her data disclosure behaviors ac-
cordingly. Such nudges can include what to do with a specific service and what
service to use among a number of options.
3.2 Joint Assessment on Privacy and Added Value
Person 
(P)
Service 
(S)
Organization 
(O)
Data 
Package 
(DP)
Online 
Account 
(OA)
Online 
Group 
(OG)
know friend
member
account
providedBy/…
Physical 
World
Cyber
World
Data (D)
own
construct
attach
7
9
8
5
6
3
2
1
10
4
11
exist
create
outsourcedTo/…
isPartOf/…
requiredBy
12
Value 
(V)
generate
Fig. 2: The ontological graph of data flows in the cyber-physical world
The joint privacy risk-value assessment process is centered around a com-
putational ontology2 that covers data flows on a directed graph describing how
personal data of the user (“me”) can possibly flow through (i.e., may be disclosed
to) different types of entities and how the returned value (as a special type of
data) can flow back to (i.e., benefit) the user in a complicated cyber-physical
world. As shown in Fig. 2, the ontology includes eight essential entity types
(nodes) and a number of relation types (edges) modeled in a generic, cyber-
physical system (CPS) data-flow graph. Specifically, entities are categorized into
three groups and colored differently: 1) physical entities (gray) that exist only in
the physical world; 2) cyber entities (white) that exist only in the cyber world
(from user’s perspective); 3) hybrid entities (gradient) that may exist in both cy-
ber and/or physical world. For each relation type between two entity types, there
2 The ontology described in this paper is an extended version of the one reported
in [24], which focuses on data flows only but not returned values.
is either a semantic meaning (solid lines) or a flow (data flow: black dash line;
value flow: gray dash line). Note that the graph can only show entity types and
possible relations between different entities. To analyze privacy issues, an entity
level graph of entities and relations are needed to support reasoning, which will
be discussed in Section 4. According to the graph theory, the data-flow graph
can be formalized as G = (V,E), where V = {V1, . . . , Vm} is a set of nodes and
each node Vi represents an entity type treated in the same way in our model
(depicted by ellipses), and E = {E1, . . . , En} are a set of edges between nodes
representing two types of relations between entities: semantic relations (repre-
sented by Type 1 edges) and data flows (represented by Type 2 edges), depicted
by dashed and solid arrows, respectively. In the proposed model, there are m = 7
different entity types (nodes) and a number of edges between them3.
The different entities types currently included in the ontology include:
– Person (P ) stands for natural persons in the physical world. The model is
user-centric as there is a special P entity called “me” – the user for whom the
model is built. The model will include other people as well because privacy
issues of “me” can occur due to data flows to other people who interact
directly or indirectly with “me”.
– Data (D) refers to atomic data items about “me” (e.g., “my name”). Data
entities may be by nature in the physical world, or in the cyber world, or in
both worlds.
– Service (S) refers to different physical and online services that serve people
for a specific purpose (e.g., a travel agent helping people to book flights).
– Data Package (DP ) refers to specific combinations of data entities re-
quired by one or more services. In this model, DP entities can be seen as
encapsulated data disclosed in a single transaction.
– Organization (O) refers to organizations that relate to one or more services
(e.g., service providers).
– Online Account (OA) refers to “virtual identities” existing on online ser-
vices. Note that even for physical services, there are often online accounts
created automatically by the service providers to allow electronic processing
and transmission of data, sometimes hidden from the users.
– Online Group (OG) refers to “virtual groups” of online accounts that exist
on a specific online service.
There are mainly two types of edges on the proposed graph. Type 1 edges
refer to existing relations with semantic meanings that may or may not relate
to personal data flows. For instance, the edge connecting the entity types P and
D means that the special P entity “me” owns some personal data items. Unlike
Type 1 edges help model the “evidence” about how and why data may flow
among these entities, Type 2 edges (possible data flows) can cause immediate
privacy impacts. Specifically, Type 2 edges refer to actual data flows from a
source to a destination entity. Most such edges are accompanied by a Type 1
edge because the latter constructs the reason why a data flow can possibly occur.
3 These numbers can grow in enhanced versions of the model.
In the following, we use Ei to denote all Type 2 edges belonging to the same
edge labelled by the number i in Fig. 2:
– E1: (DP , S) flows are normally the beginning of tracking data flows in the
cyber-physical system, generated by using online services.
– E2: (S, O) flows from S to O entities due to the existence of Type 1 edges
providedBy in between.
– E3: (O, O) flows between O entities given the fact that one Oentity has some
relation with another, e.g., isPartOf, invest or collabrateWith.
– E4: (S, S) flows between S entities due to data sharing relations between
them, e.g., suppliedBy, poweredBy or outsourcedTo.
– E5: (S, OA) flows from S to OA entities due to the existence of type 1 edges
create in between.
– E6: (OA, OA) flows between OA entities given the fact that one online
account is the friend of the other.
– E7: (OA, P ) flows from OA to P entities due to the existence of type 1 edges
account in between.
– E8: (S, OG) flows from S to OG entities due to the Type 1 edges exist in
between.
– E9: (OG, OA) flows from OG to OA entities due to a specific privacy setting
on OSNs, such as setting the contents are disclosed to “group members” only.
– E10: (P , P ) flows between P entities due to the existence of type 1 edges
know in between.
– E11: (S, P ) flows from S to P entities directly to a person without via an
OA entity, e.g., a person can see public posts on Instagram.
– E12a: (O, P ) and E12b: (P , O) flows refer to data flows between P and
O entities in both directions, each of which is due to one or more seman-
tic relations between P and O, e.g., a person owns owns orworks for an
organization.
By analyzing the ontological graph, one can manually and automatically
detect different types of privacy issues (as different topological patterns)4, and
semantic information about possible value enhancement that data disclosure
leads to, some numeric and categorical indicators (metrics) can be derived to
help prioritizing system actions (e.g., recommending to end any services causing
privacy risks immediately, or holding until services cannot offer benefits to the
user) and the construction of privacy nudges (discussed in greater details later
in Section 3.3).
With the input of individual privacy preferences, (collected) data disclo-
sure behaviors, and the entity level ontological graph about the user’s data
and value flows, a joint privacy risk-value assessment can be done to detect
potential privacy issues, measure (positive and negative)impacts, and recom-
mend mitigation solutions. In order to manage data sharing with multiple en-
tities and to reduce privacy risks, a number of user-centric personal data man-
agement platforms (PDMPs) have been developed, such as Solid (https://
4 See Sections 3 and 4 of [24] for more explanation on how the detection can be done.
solid.mit.edu/), Databox (https://www.databoxproject.uk/), Hub-of-all-
things (https://www.hubofallthings.com/) and digi.me (https://digi.me/),
to allow users manage their own data locally or in a remote data serverunder
their full control. Such platforms normally have an interface to allow new fea-
tures, e.g., data analytics and visualization tools can be added so that the user
can gain more insights about their data. The user of our proposed framework can
decide to use one or more such PDMPs so that some (or even all) data needed for
privacy risk and value enhancement assessment are stored there rather than on
local devices (see Fig. 3). Some platforms have a particular focus on empowering
the user to better manage data sharing with online services and getting values
they deserve from the data shared.
Data uploading
Data downloading
PDMPs
Initial configuration
Data transferring 
Local storage
Fig. 3: The proposed framework working with online PDMP(s) and local storage
3.3 Acting on Privacy Nudges
It is widely believed that whatsoever we do with the user will have a nudging
effect [1]. For the proposed framework, rather than focusing on privacy nudging,
we propose to construct privacy-value nudges, i.e., nudges that can help the user
find a better trade-off between privacy risks and added values related to data
disclosure decisions. In order to construct the nudges properly, it is necessary
to monitor the user’s actual data disclosure behaviors and his/her preferences.
This task is mainly implemented through the component “Behavior analysis”.
Then, based on learnt preferences, such nudges can be constructed to deliver the
expected effects, i.e. proactively avoiding risky disclosure with the knowledge
about the added values to sacrifice. For instance, Figure 4 shows an example
design where two-level nudging is considered: the first level is for privacy-value
awareness enhancement, while mainly shows information like “what privacy is-
sues exist”, “what value I have gained at what privacy costs”, “where are the
privacy issus”, and “to what extents I should care”; the second level can be trig-
gered to show more active interventions such as “what options do I have” and
“what can I do”. To the nudging contents presented on both layers, following
behaviors can be monitored and analyzed to identify suitable nudging models:
1. External behaviors refer to the behavioral change(s) after each nudge, such
as switching off “location sharing” on the smart phone or “delete the applica-
tions” after being presented a nudge about an application. This is achieved from
the real-time behavioral data collection part of the framework.
2. Internal behaviors refer to the behaviors performed on the user interfaces of
the proposed framework, such as counting the time-of-clicking of specific options
such as “keep it” and “let me know more”. This type of data is collected directly
by the software implementing the framework (see one example in Fig. 6).
Fig. 4: Human interaction on two-layer nudges
4 Case Study: Leisure Travelers
Using two example scenarios about leisure travelers, we show how the proposed
framework can help travelers to manage their data privacy for a better trade-off
between privacy risks and enhanced experience of travel (i.e., value): 1)booking
flights and accommodations through online services; 2) updating travel informa-
tion on social networks (OSNs). Through detecting possible data flows in using
travel services, the privacy risks and enhanced travel experience by disclosing
personal data can be quantified and help guide the travelers.
In order to benefit from personalized services, personal data is often requested
by travel service providers before, during, and after travel. One of the example
use cases are depicted in Fig. 5 consists of entities (rectangles), relations (solid
lines) and data flows (dash lines). Assuming that data submitted to use ser-
vices (i.e., F1-1 and F2-1) are always disclosed to service providers and its par-
ent companies (see privacy statements at https://www.booking.com/content/
privacy.en-gb.html), data flows F2-2 and F2-3 always take place so that Data
Package 2 will be disclosed to the Booking Holdings Inc. via its subsidiary Agoda
who provides the hotel booking service to the user directly. Besides, it is also
important to consider special flows caused by more complex business models. For
instance, the flight booking service at Booking.com is outsourced to GotoGate,
which is owned by a different company group Etraveli Group. However, assum-
ing the outsourcing contract always return the user data back to the requesting
company (Booking.com in this case), data flows F1-1, F1-2, F1-3, F1-4 and F1-5
will take place, so that Booking Holdings Inc. will also see Data Package 1. Now,
we can see that a single company Booking Holdings Inc. has a more complete
picture of the user’s itinerary and travel preferences by combining Data Pack-
ages 1 and 2, which may not be known to the user if he/she does not know the
business relationships between Agoda, GotoGate, Booking.com and their par-
ent companies. This can create added values with privacy concerns, e.g., now
Booking Holdings Inc. knows more about the user and can do more personalized
advertising.
<Booking: flight>
<Booking><GoToGate>
<Agoda: accommodation>
<Agoda>
<Booking Holdings Inc.><Kayak>
<Princeline.com>
<Rentalcars.com>
<Data Package-1>
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Fig. 5: Example ontological graph in the leisure travel context
In addition to data collection by service providers, online privacy leakage
can be caused by sharing personal details with other users of the same or differ-
ent services across multiple platforms (e.g., Facebook friends, Twitter followers,
etc.). Sharing travel-related information across multiple platforms however could
Fig. 6: Nudging dashboard and interfaces
reveal data to other parties, as they can infer knowledge by joining information
fragments. For instance, a traveler can upload landmark photos to Instagram
while send instant itineraries on Facebook. Once these pieces are viewed by
someone who owns “friend accounts” on both platforms, the traveler’s location
privacy may be threatened. Such issues can be detected by tracking data flows.
Now let us give some example user interfaces for a different privacy issue.
As shown in Fig. 6, the first-level interface presents an overview of data disclo-
sure activities of some “monitored apps”, including a joint analysis of privacy
risks and value enhancement those data disclosure activities lead to. For exam-
ple, it shows that Booking.com is deemed a “risky app” but the user has also
achieved a lot of benefits by using it. In addition, the example interface allows
the user to “check details without taking actions” by clicking a question mark,
which will lead the user to the second level of user interface. Given the KB and
the user’s disclosure behaviors, the system detects that a sensitive unit “MED-
ICAL CERTIFICATE” could have flowed to two different company groups and
over 10 sub-companies, many of which are unknown to the user, due to spe-
cial booking requirements. The system then labels this as a privacy issue after
checking the user’s current privacy preference. Being notified about this spe-
cific privacy issue and after considering any enhanced travel experience this may
bring, the user can choose to accept the risky disclosure or request deletion of
the data disclosure from some companies immediately (which may mean loss of
special assistance during travel), and can adapt his/her future data disclosure
behaviors accordingly. The user’s choices are recorded to help personalize the
user interface and future nudges, following the “human-in-the-loop” principle.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we report a user-centric and privacy-aware personal data manage-
ment framework, allowing a user to better manage his/her privacy in the context
of interacting with multiple services and people in the cyber-physical world, via
a joint privacy risk-value analysis architecture covering user preference manage-
ment, joint privacy risk-value assessment, and joint privacy-value nudging. We
illustrate the usefulness of the framework by using a case study about leisure
travelers. Moreover, there is a number of key areas for further development of
the proposed framework, which we leave as our future work.
Studying added values in different contexts, using travel as a highlighted con-
text for the PriVELT project. In which forms such “added values” can be rep-
resented in real-world scenarios and how they relate with data disclosure (i.e.,
data flows) will be studied to enrich the computational knowledge base used in
the proposed framework.
Profiling travelers on their preferred balance between data disclosure and value
enhancement. To build a user-centric platform for privacy protection purposes,
it is essential to learn what the privacy risks and added values mean to different
users. While designing the adaptive application, this work mainly involves two
facets: traveler profiling based on self-reported answers to privacy-related ques-
tions, and learning travelers’ preferences from actual behaviors, which include
the data disclosure and other interacting behaviors to online services and tools
implementing the proposed framework.
Conceptualizing and quantifying privacy risks and added values. Based on
data flow analysis, personal preferences and the semantic information in the
knowledge base, we aim to study how to conceptualize and quantify privacy
risks and added values. This will involve evolving ontological graph models and
developing privacy risk indicators needed for different components such as the
privacy nudge engine. Any indicators will need to cover both privacy risks and
added value, and will need to be personalized if possible.
Associating added values and privacy risks. As discussed, the use of online
services causes data disclosure, and then privacy risks, potentially. Meanwhile,
users can achieve benefits from organisations (discounts, personalized services
etc.) by disclosing personal information. To facilitate users’ comprehension on
privacy risks, the trade-off between privacy risks and added value needs to be
interactively presented for each app.
Constructing privacy nudging based on the user’s preferences. The construc-
tion of privacy nudging should be determined by learnt personal preferences.
While presenting the results from real-time disclosures, privacy nudging should
give concrete and actionable recommendations such as “which services bring
more privacy risks for exchanging what added values” and “what can be done to
mitigate such more risky services”. To effectively help privacy-related decisions,
we will conduct a number of user studies to design our privacy nudging strategies
and graphical elements for an implementation of the proposed framework.
Acknowledgement.
The authors’ work was supported by the research project, PRIvacy-aware per-
sonal data management and Value Enhancement for Leisure Travellers (PriV-
ELT), funded by the EPSRC (Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Coun-
cil)in the UK, under grant number EP/R033749/1.
References
1. Acquisti, Alessandro, A.I., Balebako, R., Brandimarte, L., Cranor, L.F., Koman-
duri, S., Leon, P.G., Sadeh, N., Schaub, F., Sleeper, M., Wang, Y., Wilson, S.:
Nudges for privacy and security: Understanding and assisting users & choices on-
line. ACM Computing Survey 50(3), 44:1–44:41 (2017)
2. Ajzen, I.: The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and human
decision processes 50(2), 179–211 (1991)
3. Almuhimedi, H., Schaub, F., Sadeh, N., Adjerid, I., Acquisti, A., Gluck, J., Cranor,
L.F., Agarwal, Y.: Your location has been shared 5,398 times!: A field study on
mobile app privacy nudging. In: Proceedings of the 33rd annual ACM conference
on human factors in computing systems. pp. 787–796. ACM (2015)
4. Alnemr, R., Cayirci, E., Corte, L.D., Garaga, A., Leenes, R., Mhungu, R., Pearson,
S., Reed, C., Anderson Santana de Oliveira, Dimitra Stefanatou, K.T., Vranaki,
A.: A data protection impact assessment methodology for cloud. In: Privacy Tech-
nologies and Policy: Third Annual Privacy Forum, APF 2015, Luxembourg, Lux-
embourg, October 7-8, 2015, Revised Selected Papers. pp. 60–92. Springer (2015)
5. Amr Ali-Eldin, A.Z., Janssen, M.: A privacy risk assessment model for open data.
In: Business Modeling and Software Design: 7th International Symposium, BMSD
2017, Barcelona, Spain, July 3–5, 2017, Revised Selected Papers. Springer (2018)
6. Awad, N.F., Krishnan, M.S.: The personalization privacy paradox: an empirical
evaluation of information transparency and the willingness to be profiled online
for personalization. MIS Quarterly pp. 13–28 (2006)
7. Bier, C., Ku¨hne, K., Beyerer, J.: Privacyinsight: the next generation privacy dash-
board. In: Annual Privacy Forum. pp. 135–152. Springer (2016)
8. Cavoukian, A.: Privacy by design – The 7 foundational principles.
Tech. rep. (2011), https://ipc.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/Resources/
7foundationalprinciples.pdf
9. CNIL: Privacy impact assessment (PIA): Knowledge bases. Tech. rep.,
Paris: Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Liberte´s (CNIL)
(2018), https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/cnil-pia-3-
en-knowledgebases.pdf
10. CNIL: Privacy impact assessment (PIA): Methodology. Tech. rep., Paris: Com-
mission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Liberte´s (CNIL) (2018), https://www.
cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/cnil-pia-1-en-methodology.pdf
11. CNIL: Privacy impact assessment (PIA): Template. Tech. rep., Paris: Commission
Nationale de l’Informatique et des Liberte´s (CNIL) (2018), https://www.cnil.
fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/cnil-pia-2-en-templates.pdf
12. Das, A., Degeling, M., Smullen, D., Sadeh, N.: Personalized privacy assistants for
the internet of things: Providing users with notice and choice. IEEE Pervasive
Computing 17(3), 35–46 (2018)
13. Elueze, I., Quan-Haase, A.: Privacy attitudes and concerns in the digital lives of
older adults: Westin’s privacy attitude typology revisited. American Behavioral
Scientist 62(10), 1372–1391 (2018)
14. Go´mez-Barroso, J.L.: Experiments on personal information disclosure: Past and
future avenues. Telematics and Informatics 35(5), 1473–1490 (2018)
15. Hansen, M.: Marrying transparency tools with user-controlled identity manage-
ment. In: IFIP International Summer School on the Future of Identity in the In-
formation Society. pp. 199–220. Springer (2007)
16. Hedbom, H.: A survey on transparency tools for enhancing privacy. In: IFIP Sum-
mer School on the Future of Identity in the Information Society. pp. 67–82. Springer
(2008)
17. Kaur, K., Gupta, I., Singh, A.K.: A comparative study of the approach provided
for preventing the data leakage. International Journal of Network Security & Its
Applications 9(5), 21–33 (2017)
18. King, J.: Taken out of context: An empirical analysis of westin’s privacy scale. In:
Workshop on Privacy Personas and Segmentation. p. 2014 (2014)
19. Kumaraguru, P., Cranor, L.F.: Privacy indexes: a survey of Westin’s studies.
Tech. rep. (2005), http://reports-archive.adm.cs.cmu.edu/anon/isri2005/
CMU-ISRI-05-138.pdf
20. LaRose, R., Rifon, N.J.: Promoting i-Safety: Effects of privacy warnings and pri-
vacy seals on risk assessment and online privacy behavior. Journal of Consumer
Affairs 41(1), 127–149 (2007)
21. Laufer, R.S., Wolfe, M.: Privacy as a concept and a social issue: A multidimensional
developmental theory. Journal of Social Issues 33(3), 22–42 (1977)
22. Li, Y.: Theories in online information privacy research: A critical review and an
integrated framework. Decision Support Systems 54(1), 471–481 (2012)
23. Lin, J., Liu, B., Sadeh, N., Hong, J.I.: Modeling users’ mobile app privacy prefer-
ences: Restoring usability in a sea of permission settings. In: Proceedings of 10th
Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security. pp. 199–212 (2014)
24. Lu, Y., Li, S.: From data flows to privacy issues: A user-centric semantic model
for representing and discovering privacy issues. In: Proceedings of 53rd Hawaii
International Conference on System Sciences (2020)
25. Lu, Y., Ou, C., Angelopoulos, S.: Exploring the effect of monetary incentives on
user behavior in online sharing platforms. In: Proceedings of the 51st Hawaii In-
ternational Conference on System Sciences (2018)
26. Miniwatts Marketing Group: World Internet usage and population statis-
tics – Updated in March, 2019. Internet World Stats (2019), https://www.
internetworldstats.com/stats.htm
27. Mylonas, A., Theoharidou, M., Gritzalis, D.: Assessing privacy risks in Android: A
user-centric approach. In: Risk Assessment and Risk-Driven Testing: First Inter-
national Workshop, RISK 2013, Held in Conjunction with ICTSS 2013, Istanbul,
Turkey, November 12, 2013. Revised Selected Papers. pp. 21–37. Springer (2013)
28. Naeini, P.E., Bhagavatula, S., Habib, H., Degeling, M., Bauer, L., Cranor, L.F.,
Sadeh, N.: Privacy expectations and preferences in an IoT world. In: Proceed-
ings of 13th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security. pp. 399–412. USENIX
Association (2017)
29. Park, Y.J.: Digital literacy and privacy behavior online. Communication Research
40(2), 215–236 (2013)
30. Peddinti, S.T., Collins, A., Sedley, A., Taft, N., Turner, A., Woodruff, A.: Perceived
frequency of advertising practices (2015), https://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2015/
papers/ppsPeddiniti.pdf
31. Qiu, M., Gai, K., Thuraisingham, B., Tao, L., Zhao, H.: Proactive user-centric
secure data scheme using attribute-based semantic access controls for mobile clouds
in financial industry. Future Generation Computer Systems 80, 421–429 (2018)
32. Rastogi, V., Qu, Z., McClurg, J., Cao, Y., Chen, Y.: Uranine: Real-time privacy
leakage monitoring without system modification for Android. In: Proceedings of
11th EAI International Conference Security and Privacy in Communication Net-
works. pp. 256–276. Springer (2010)
33. Schneider, C., Weinmann, M., vom Brocke, J.: Digital nudging: Guiding online
user choices through interface design. Communications of the ACM 61(7), 67–73
(2018)
34. Seto, Y.: Application of privacy impact assessment in the smart city. Electronics
and Communications in Japan 98(2), 52–61 (2015)
35. Sheehan, K.B.: Toward a typology of internet users and online privacy concerns.
The Information Society 18(1), 21–32 (2002)
36. Smith, H.J., Milberg, S.J., Burke, S.J.: Information privacy: Measuring individuals’
concerns about organizational practices. MIS Quarterly pp. 167–196 (1996)
37. Stone, E.F., Stone, D.L.: Privacy in organizations: Theoretical issues, research
findings, and protection mechanisms. Research in Personnel and Human Resources
Management 8(3), 349–411 (1990)
38. Tian, Y., Zhang, N., Lin, Y.H., Wang, X., Ur, B., Guo, X., Tague, P.: SmartAuth:
User-centered authorization for the Internet of Things. In: Proceedings of 26th
USENIX Security Symposium. pp. 361–378. USENIX (2017)
39. Wagner, I., Boiten, E.: Privacy risk assessment: From art to science, by metrics.
In: Data Privacy Management, Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain Technology, pp.
225–241. Springer (2018)
40. Warren, A., Bayley, R., Bennett, C., Charlesworth, A., Clarke, R., Oppenheim, C.:
Privacy impact assessments: International experience as a basis for UK guidance.
Computer Law & Security Review 24(3), 233–242 (2008)
41. Weinmann, M., Schneider, C., vom Brocke, J.: Digital nudging. Business & Infor-
mation Systems Engineering 58(6), 433–436 (2016)
42. Westin, A.F.: Harris-Equifax consumer privacy survey 1991. Equifax Inc (1991)
43. Wisniewski, P.J., Knijnenburg, B.P., Lipford, H.R.: Making privacy personal: Pro-
filing social network users to inform privacy education and nudging. International
Journal of Human-Computer Studies 98, 95–108 (2017)
44. Woodruff, A., Pihur, V., Consolvo, S., Brandimarte, L., Acquisti, A.: Would a
privacy fundamentalist sell their DNA for $1000... if nothing bad happened as a
result? the Westin categories, behavioral intentions, and consequences. In: Pro-
ceedings of 10th Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security. pp. 1–18. USENIX
Association (2014)
45. Xu, K., Guo, Y., Guo, L., Fang, Y., Li, X.: My privacy my decision: Control of
photo sharing on online social networks. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and
Secure Computing 14(2), 199–210 (2017)
46. Zhu, H., Chen, E., Xiong, H., Yu, K., Cao, H., Tian, J.: Mining mobile user prefer-
ences for personalized context-aware recommendation. ACM Transactions on In-
telligent Systems and Technology 5(4), 58:1–58:27 (2015)
